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Statutory Post-Judgment Interest: The Effect of 
Legislative Changes After Judgment and 
Suggestions for Construction 
Post-judgment1 interest did not exist at common law and 
is solely a matter of legislative grace.2 For the most part, 
states3 have enacted statutes allowing for an award of interest 
on money judgments to compensate the judgment creditor for 
not having use of the judgment money (i.e. during the appeals 
process) until paid by the judgment debtor.* Such statutes 
have generally set the rate of interest that is applied to the 
judgment debt until it is paid in full. 
From time to time, legislatures find it necessary to  change 
the set statutory rate of interest for post-judgment debts to 
keep in line with current economic conditions. These changes, 
though necessary, have resulted in a wealth of l i t igat i~n.~ Pri- 
marily, such a change raises the question whether the new rate 
is to apply retroactively t o  all judgments, prospectively t o  out- 
standing amounts owed on prior judgments, or only to judg- 
ments rendered after the new rate's effective date. 
Part I1 of this comment compares the approaches taken by 
the courts when interpreting post-judgment interest statutes in 
light of a change in the rate following entry of judgment. Part 
I11 discusses the purposes and language of various post-judg- 
ment interest rate statutes and suggests ways in which leg- 
1. Spellings of this word are as  varied as the statutes and cases which dis- 
cuss it. 
2. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 840 (1990) 
("At common law, judgments do not bear interest; interest rests solely upon stat- 
utory provision." (citations omitted)). 
3. The federal government has also provided for post-judgment interest. See 
28 U.S.C. $ 1961 (1994). For a comprehensive discussion of post-judgment interest 
in federal courts, see Susan M. Payor, Post-Judgment Interest in Federal Courts, 37 
EMORY L.J. 495 (1988). 
4. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE $ 685.010 (West 1987) ("on the principal 
amount of a money judgment remaining unsatisfied"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, 
para. 5/2-1303 (Smith-Hurd 1992) ("until satisfied"). 
5 .  See generally Diane M .  Allen, Annotation, Retrospective Application and 
Effect of State Statute or Rule Allowing Interest or Changing Rate of Interest on 
Judgments or Verdicts, 41 A.L.Rdth 694 (1985). 
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islatures can effectuate rate changes while preventing litigation 
on the issue. Part IV examines Utah's recent change in the 
post-judgment interest rate to illustrate how current judicial 
doctrines are applied to determine the effect of a statutory rate 
change on existing judgments. This comment concludes that for 
most states, more careful statutory drafting would better effec- 
tuate the purposes of post-judgment interest and eliminate 
most if not all litigation over this issue. 
11. THE JUDICIAL DEBATE: INTERPRETING THE STATUTES 
A. The Plain Language Test 
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a court 
should give effect to the plain language of the statute. Deter- 
mining the applicable rate of interest is an easy question if the 
language of the statute clearly states what rate applies to judg- 
ments entered during a specific period of time or indicates 
whether or not the new rate is t o  apply to existing judgments 
or only to  judgments entered after the date of the amendment. 
For example, the Alaska Supreme Court found the following 
statutory language plain: "The interest rate provided in sec. 1 
of this Act applies only to those judgments rendered after the 
effective date of this 
Courts have found that certain phrases plainly indicate an 
intent t o  apply the statute only to future judgments. For in- 
stance, in Puget Sound National Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Ma- 
rine Insurance Co.,' the Court of Appeals of Washington held 
that the phrase "from the date of entry thereof" clearly estab- 
lished the legislature's intent that the statute apply only pro- 
spectively. The court found "[tlhe language of the act . . . clear. 
By providing that the interest rate as amended will apply to a 
judgment 'from the date of entry thereof,' the legislature mani- 
fested an intent that the new interest rate apply only to judg- 
ments entered after the act's effective date."8 
6. ALASKA STAT. 09.30.070 (1980), cited in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. 
Anderson, 669 P.2d 956, 957 (Alaska 1983); see also In re Lattig, 318 N.W.2d 811, 
816 n.4 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) ("This Act is effective January 1, 1981 and shall not 
apply to judgments rendered or decrees entered of record before that date."); Coast- 
al Indus. Water Auth. v. Trinity Portland Cement Div., Gen. Portland Cement Co., 
563 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. 1978) ("[Tlhe provision in the amended statute that 
judgments shall bear interest at the rate of nine percent from and aRer the date 
of the judgment, plainly suggests that the rate shall be applied prospectively only." 
(citation omitted)). 
7. 645 P.2d 1122, 1131 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982). 
8. Id.; see also Bartlett v. Heersche, 496 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Kan. 1972) (The 
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Additionally, in Southeastern Freight Lines v. Michelin Tire 
Corp.: the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the 
words "enrolled or entered" established that the 'legislative 
intent, as shown by the clear language of the statute, was t o  
apply the new interest rate to judgments entered before the 
effective date of the amendment which remain outstanding on 
that date."1° 
Very broad language which applies to all judgments with- 
out limit has also been interpreted by courts as a plain indica- 
tion that the statute applies to  outstanding as well as future 
judgments. For example, in Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co. v. 
Central Rigging & Contracting Corp.," the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that "[slince the statute literally extends 
t o  'all judgments in this state,' and [because] there are strong 
policy reasons for applying the same," the plaintiff was entitled 
t o  post-judgment interest at an increased rate from the effec- 
tive date of amendment.'" 
Clear statutory language will go a long way toward reduc- 
ing litigation which results from changes in post-judgment 
interest statutes. Absent such clear language, however, courts 
must engage in further analysis t o  determine legislative intent 
regarding a rate change. 
B. To Be or Not To Be Applied Retroactively (First Prong) 
As a general rule, when the statutory language is not 
clear, courts have followed a two-pronged approach to  deter- 
mine if and when a newly amended post-judgment interest 
statute applies to an existing judgment. First, a court will ad- 
dress whether the rate change should be applied retroactively 
t o  the existing judgment from the judgment date. If not, the 
court will next consider whether the new rate applies prospec- 
tively from its effective date to amounts still owed on existing 
judgments. Although not all courts considering this issue have 
applied both prongs, those that have considered only one of the 
two prongs have either implicitly or explicitly assumed the 
answer to the other. 
language "from the day on which they are rendered [suggests that the statute 
should] be applied prospectively only."). 
9. 303 S.E.2d 860 (S.C. 1983). 
10. Id. at 861. 
11. 684 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1982). 
12. Id. at 1389. 
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1. General principles of statutory construction 
When the plain language of the statute does not offer any 
clear direction to the court, further analysis is necessary to de- 
termine whether a newly amended post-judgment interest 
statute applies retroactively to judgments entered prior to the 
effective date of the amendment. The general rule for amended 
statutes is that they do not apply retroactively absent clear 
legislative intent.13 A typical example comes from South Caro- 
lina. In considering what application to give t o  a recently 
amended post-judgment interest statute, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court held, "The presumption is [that] statutory en- 
actments are prospective absent clear legislative intent or spe- 
cific provision to  the contrary; however, a remedial or procedur- 
al statute is generally held to be retroactive."14 In a number of 
states, this presumption has its origin in the state constitution 
or statutes.15 Under this approach, determining the retroac- 
tive effect of a new statute or amendment providing for post- 
judgment interest requires the court to determine whether the 
statute fits within the exception for "procedural" statutes hav- 
ing no substantive effect on the rights of either party. 
2. The procedural /remedial exception 
Each state which has addressed the question of whether a 
statutory provision for post-judgment interest is substantive or 
procedural has determined that such statutes are substantive 
in nature and should not be applied retroactively to pre-exist- 
ing judgments? The Georgia Court of Appeals has offered a 
13. A number of states require not only clear legislative intent for retroactive 
application, but also that the statute be procedural and not affect the substantive 
rights of any party. Discussion of the procedural exception is reserved for the next 
section. See infra part II.B.2. 
14. Southeastern Freight Lines v. Michelin Tire Corp., 303 S.E.2d 860, 861 
(S.C. 1983) (citation omitted). 
15. See, e.g., Mo. CONST. art. I, § 13. 
16. See, eg., McKeague v. Talbert, 658 P.2d 898, 909 n.11 (Haw. Ct. App. 
1983) (In dicta, the court states: "The rule swims against the current of the gen- 
eral rule against retroactivity. Also, we do not think that once a judgment is en- 
tered and interest awarded a subsequent amendment in the statutory interest rate 
on judgments can be applied retroactively." (citations omitted)); Bartlett v. 
Heersche, 496 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Kan. 1972) ("A settled principle of statutory con- 
struction requires that statutes be given prospective operation only, unless contrary 
legislative intent is expressed clearly, or necessarily implied from the language 
used." (citation omitted)); Shelist v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 215 N.E.2d 748, 
751 (Mass. 1966) ("A change in the rate of interest would affect the substantive 
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reason why applying a statute amending the post-judgment 
interest rate retroactively should not be allowed: "The law of 
this State is that 'unless a statute either expressly or by neces- 
sary implication, shows that the General Assembly intended 
that it operate retroactively, it  will be given only prospective 
appli~ation.'"'~ The court continued: "[Tlo the extent that [con- 
struing an amending statute to have a retroactive effect on 
existing judgments] would cast doubt and uncertainty upon the 
rights and liabilities of the parties as fixed by judgments under 
the law as it existed prior to [the effective date of the amend- 
ment], it  would violate the principle of finality of judg- 
ments."18 
In summary, absent clear statutory language expressing 
the desire to apply the statute retroactively to judgments al- 
ready in existence, or case law in a particular jurisdiction indi- 
cating that statutes providing for interest are procedural rather 
than substantive, it  is unlikely that a court would hold that an  
amended statute providing for post-judgment interest should be 
applied retroactively. 
C. Prospective Application From Effective Date (Second 
Prong) 
Although no court has been willing, absent clear statutory 
language, to apply from the date of judgment a new post-judg- 
ment interest rate to previously entered judgments, many 
rights of the parties as of the time of the taking." (citation omitted)); White v. St. 
Louis-San Francisco Ry., 602 S.W.2d 748, 756 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) ("A statute shall 
not be applied retrospectively except where the legislature manifests a clear intent 
that it  do so and where the statute is procedural only and does not effect [sic] any 
substantive right of the parties. The present statute does not meet the exception 
and shall not be applied retrospectively." (citation omitted)); People a rel. Atlantic, 
Gulf & Pac. Co. v. Miller, 17 N.Y.S.2d 202, 209 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ("The statute with 
which we are here concerned contains no express language indicating it is to have 
retroactive operation. Therefore its effect must be deemed prospective only." (cita- 
tions omitted)); Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 476 P.2d 329, 
346 (Okla. 1970) ("A settled principal [sic] of statutory construction requires stat- 
utes be given prospective operation only, unless contrary legislative intent is ex- 
pressed clearly, or necessarily implied from the language used."); Southeastern 
Freight Lines v. Michelin Tire Corp., 303 S.E.2d 860, 861 (S.C. 1983) ("The pre- 
sumption is statutory enactments are prospective absent clear legislative intent or 
specific provision to the contrary; however, a remedial or procedural statute is 
generally held to be retroactive." (citation omitted)). 
17. Department of Tramp. v. Delta Mach. Prods. Co., 291 S.E.2d 104, 106 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting Anthony v. P ~ M ,  92 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. 1956)). 
18. Id. at 107. 
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courts have been persuaded to apply the new interest rate to  
amounts owed on existing judgments, beginning from the 
amendment's effective date. Many courts hold that this is a 
prospective rather than a retroactive application of the new 
statute. The courts have viewed the issue as whether a judg- 
ment and the accompanying interest rate, once rendered, to- 
gether create a vested contract or property right in a party, or 
whether the interest is simply statutory and thus subject to 
change or extinguishment at  the will of the legislature that 
gave it life. 
In Morley v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway 
Co.,lg the United States Supreme Court held that a cause of 
action based on a tort or on a contract which did not prescribe 
a rate of interest was not a contract in the ordinary sense when 
merged into a judgment. Rather, whether interest accrues upon 
a judgment is a matter of legislative d is~re t ion .~~ The Court 
concluded that a legislature 
is free, so far as the Constitution of the United States is con- 
cerned, to provide for interest as a penalty or liquidated dam- 
ages for the non-payment of the judgment, or not to do so. 
When such provision is made by statute, the owner of the 
judgment is, of course, entitled to the interest so prescribed 
until payment is received, or until the State shall, in the 
exercise of its discretion, declare that such interest shall be 
changed or cease to accrue. Should the statutory damages for 
non-payment of a judgment be determined by a State, either 
in whole or in part, the owner of a judgment will be entitled 
t o  receive and have a vested right in the damages which shall 
have accrued up to the date of the legislative change; but 
after that time his rights as to interest as damages are, as 
when he first obtained his judgment, just what the legislature 
chooses to declare. He has no contract whatever on the sub- 
ject with the defendant in the judgment, and his right is t o  
receive, and the defendant's obligation is to pay, a s  damages, 
just what the State chooses t o  pre~cribe.~' 
19. 146 U.S. 162 (1892). 
20. Id. at 168. 
21. Id. at 168-69. Within a year, the Supreme Court decided a similar case 
based on Texas law. The judgment involved had been entered at a time when the 
statute provided for 8% interest on judgments. Later, the statute was amended to 
provide for 6% interest on judgments. Without mentioning Morley, the Court held 
that "interest was properly included at the rate which obtained under the law of 
Texas at the time judgment was rendered, the change in the law in that respect 
operating only prospectively." Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Anderson, 149 US. 237, 242 
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Justice Harlan dissented, taking the position that rights once 
acquired by legislative enactment cannot be destroyed by sub- 
sequent enactment because the judgment is a property right 
which cannot be infringed by the legislature without due pro- 
cess of 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court followed the Morley 
majority's rationale in Missouri & Arkansas Lumber & Mining 
Co. u. Greenwood District of Se bastian County, A r k a n ~ a s . ~ ~  
Quoting extensively from Morley, the Court held that the right 
to post-judgment interest is based on public policy concerns and 
is completely "outside the sphere of private contracts."24 The 
majority of the states addressing this issue have followed 
(1893). 
22. Morley, 146 US. at  173-78. 
23. 249 U.S. 170 (1919). 
24. Id. at 173. For another federal case holding similarly, see Shook & 
Fletcher Insulation Co. v. Central Rigging & Contracting Corp., 684 F.2d 1383, 
1389 (11th Cir. 1982) (post-judgment rate of interest under old statute is a "crea- 
ture of statute, not contract" and thus may be changed by the legislature, where 
new rate applied from statute's effective date). See also Glades County v. Kurtz, 
101 F.2d 759, 760 (5th Cir. 1939): 
The rate thus determined was not contractual, and the power of the state 
to change or modify it was neither exhausted by the rendition of the 
judgment nor restricted by constitutional limitations. . . . In the sense 
that it is a contract, the provision of the judgment, whether expressed or 
implied, providing for payment of interest is an expression of the sover- 
eign will, supplying whatever may be lacking in mutual consent. When, 
because of changing conditions, the will relaxes and substitutes a new 
and different provision, it modifies or impairs no contract that the parties 
have made. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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M ~ r l e y . ~ ~  Noe v. City of ~h icago '~  illustrates a typical hold- 
ing and rationale. There the Illinois Supreme Court held, 
Interest was not allowed at  common law, but is solely the 
creature of the statute, and can only be recovered according to 
its terms. The rights of the parties in respect to interest were 
not governed by contract, but by statute, which might be 
changed a t  any time, in the pleasure of the legislature, with- 
out impairing any contract, or affecting any vested right.27 
Finally, the court found "unrealistic" arguments that a judg- 
ment and its interest are contractual in nature.28 
In spite of the view expressed in Morley, a minority of 
states have held that the rights and liabilities of the parties 
are fixed by the judgment under the law as it existed a t  the 
time the judgment was rendered and that the amended rate 
applies only to judgments entered after amendment.2g For ex- 
25. See, e.g., McBride v. Superior Court, 635 P.2d 178, 179 (Ariz. 1981) ("[Wle 
do not believe that a judgment is a contractual obligation. Judgments are the re- 
sult of the operation of the law. They are seldom based upon mutuality of the 
parties."); Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 37 P.2d 407, 
412 (Idaho 1934) ("Interest upon a judgment is not a matter of contract, but is 
wholly statutory. A judgment can bear interest a t  such a rate only as the law pro- 
vides."); Puget Sound Nat'l. Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 645 P.2d 
1122, 1131 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (We  recognize that a legislative body may pro- 
vide that a new interest rate will apply to existing judgments as  well as those 
entered after the act's effective date, the right to such interest being not contractu- 
al but a matter of legislative discretion."); see also Bartlett v. Heersche, 496 P.2d 
1314, 1319 (Kan. 1972) (Prager, J., dissenting) (arguing that judgments are not a 
matter of contract but an obligation implied or imposed by law); Ridge v. Ridge, 
572 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Ky. 1978); Mayor of Baltimore v. Kelso Corp., 449 A.2d 406, 
409 (Md. 1982); Senn v. Commerce-Manchester Bank, 603 S.W.2d 551, 553-54 (Mo. 
1980); White v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 602 S.W.2d 748, 756 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1980). 
26. 307 N.E.2d 376 (Iil. 1974). 
27. Id. a t  379 (citation omitted). 
28. Id. ("[Wle consider that the holdings that a judgment is a contract or in 
the nature of a contract are forced and unrealistic. To be preferred are the hold- 
ings that interest on a judgment arises from a statute's operation and not from 
any contract or other agreement of the parties."). 
29. See, eg., Department of Transp. v. Delta Mach. Prods. Co., 291 S.E.2d 
104, 106-07 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982). See also Butler v. Rockwell, 29 P. 458, 460 (Colo. 
1892): 
I t  is unquestionably true that a judgment partakes of the nature of a 
contract sufficiently to supersede the original contract or cause of action, 
both as to principal and interest. The original contract or cause of action 
becomes merged, and the judgment constitutes a new and liquidated debt. 
This debt, and the liability for interest thereon as provided by statute a t  
the date of the judgment, are obligations binding upon the debtor till the 
judgment is reversed or satisfied. 
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ample, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that "the rights of 
the parties as embodied in a judgment, including the rate of 
interest after judgment, are not changed by a subsequent 
change in the law."30 
111. LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
A. The Purpose of Post-Judgment Interest 
There are two discernible purposes for post-judgment inter- 
est: 1) compensation to the judgment creditor for not having 
use of the money owed; and 2) punishment of the judgment 
debtor to encourage him o r  her to  pay the judgment without 
undue delay. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that 
"[ilnterest is the compensation allowed by law, or fixed by the 
parties, for the use or forbearance of money, o r  as damages for 
its detenti~n."~' The majority of courts which have discussed 
the purpose of post-judgment interest statutes have echoed this 
principle." For example, the highest court of Maryland, in 
interpreting that state's post-judgment interest statute, ex- 
plained that the "purpose of postjudgment interest is to com- 
Id. (citations omitted). 
30. Sammons Enters. v. Manley, 554 S.W.2d 205, 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), 
aff'd, Manley v. Sammons Enters., 563 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1978). 
31. Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 177, 185 (1872). 
32. See, e.g., Equifax, Inc. v. Luster, 463 F. Supp. 352, 356 (E.D. Ark. 1978) 
("The purpose of interest on judgments is to compensate the judgment creditor for 
the fact that he has not had the use of . . . money that has been adjudged to be 
his."), aff'd sub nom. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Luster, 604 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 916 (1980); Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., 837 P.2d 1273, 1296-97 
(Haw. 1992) ("Post-judgment interest on prejudgment interest [would be] a windfall 
to plaintiff under [this section,] and, as such, [would be] more punitive than com- 
pensatory."), modified, 843 P.2d 144 (Haw. 1992); Hunsaker v. Hunsaker, 786 P.2d 
583, 585 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990) ("The apparent policy of this statute is to insure 
that a prevailing party will receive all the rights and benefits of a money judg- 
ment when it  is due."); Farmer v. Stubblefield, 180 S.W.2d 405, 405 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1944) ("At common law judgments did not bear interest and the purpose of the 
statute was to . . . insure compensation to the creditor for the loss of the use of 
his money during the period in which he was wrongfully deprived of it."); Benefi- 
cial Discount Co. v. Spike, 398 N.Y.S.2d 651, 653 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (Statutes provid- 
ing that money judgments are to "bear interest from date of entry [at rate of 6% 
indicate] that interest on a judgment represents damages recoverable by the judg- 
ment creditor for the non-payment or detention of monies due and owing on [a] 
judgment" against a judgment debtor.); Adarns v. Nissan Motor Corp., 387 S.E.2d 
288, 295 (W. Va. 1989) ("legislature intended that post-judgment interest be 
available to compensate an individual for the delay between the judgment and the 
receipt of actual payment"). 
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pensate the judgment creditor for the loss of the monies that 
are due and owing to him from the time the judgment is en- 
tered until it is paid."33 Referring to the statutory amendment 
which increased the post-judgment interest rate, the court held 
that "[tlhe change in the interest rate, from six to 10 percent 
per annum, recognized that the old rate no longer fairly com- 
pensated judgment ~redi tors ."~~ 
The Eleventh Circuit used similar language when forecast- 
ing what the Georgia Supreme Court would hold if it were to 
decide what effect an amendment in Georgia's post-judgment 
statute would have on a prior judgment. The court found "sub- 
stantial policy grounds for giving the statute literal effect. The 
purpose for increasing the rate of interest accruing to judg- 
ments was to acknowledge an increase in interes't rates in 
general and to bring the rate of interest on judgments into 
parity with other comparable market rates of intere~t."~' 
Judicial decisions in very few states have viewed post-judg- 
ment interest as a measure designed to punish the judgment 
debtor for not paying the amount of the judgment.36 As a re- 
sult, the remainder of this comment will assume that the pur- 
pose of post-judgment interest is to compensate the judgment 
creditor for loss of use of the judgment debt. 
B. Post- Judgment Interest Rate Statutes 
States have chosen a variety of methods of setting their 
post-judgment interest rate, ranging from the simple to the 
sophisticated. Many states set the interest rate at a specific 
percentage in the statute itself.37 For example, the relevant 
Illinois statute provides that "Lj]udgments recovered in any 
33. Mayor of Baltimore v. Kelso Corp., 449 A.2d 406, 409 @Id. 1982). 
34. Id. 
35. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co. v. Central Rigging & Contracting Corp., 
684 F.2d 1383, 1388 (11th Cir. 1982). 
36. See Courtenay v. Wilhoit, 655 S.W.2d 41, 42-43 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) ("The 
statute's function is to encourage a judgment debtor to timely comply with the 
terms of the judgment" and in the case of a separation agreement incorporated in 
a divorce decree, to encourage fulfillment of the obligations incurred in the agree- 
ment.); Herring v. Golden State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 318 N.W.2d 641, 646 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1982) ("The statute referred to by plaintiff is in the nature of a penalty to be 
assessed against insurers for dilatory practices in settling meritorious claims . . . . 
Such statutes, having a punitive purpose, are never given retroactive effect." (cita- 
tion omitted)). 
37. See, e.g., AM. CODE $ 8-8-10 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. $ 16-65-114 (Michie 
1987); MONT. CODE ANN. $ 25-9-205 (1993). See generally Appendix 1. 
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court shall draw interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the 
date of the judgment until ~atisfied."~' 
Other states do not provide for a specific post-judgment 
interest rate, but tie the rate to some sort of index or standard- 
ized market rate. Minnesota, for example, provides that the 
rate of interest on a judgment "shall be based on the secondary 
market yield of one year United States treasury bills."39 Texas 
computes the post-judgment rate "by taking the auction rate 
quoted on a discount basis for 52-week treasury bills issued by 
the United States government as published by the Federal 
Reserve Board on the most recent date preceding the date of 
comp~tation.'"~ This rate is limited, however, to a minimum 
of 10% and a maximum of 20%.41 
Many states use a combination: an index or market rate 
plus a set percentageO4' For example, color ad^^^ and Dela- 
ware44 add 2% and 5%, respectively, to the Federal Discount 
Rate. Nevada adds 2% to the prime rate a t  the largest bank in 
the state of Ne~ada:~  while the District of Columbia's rate is 
"70 percent of the rate of interest set by the Secretary of the 
Treasury pursuant to section 6621 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986."~~ 
A few states allow for a different rate than that specified 
by statute to be applied by the judge if circumstances war- 
rant.47 Two states simply leave the rate of interest to be ap- 
plied to judgments t o  the discretion of the judiciary. Mississippi 
law provides that "judgments or decrees shall bear interest at  a 
per annum rate set by the judge hearing the complaint from a 
date determined by such judge to be fair but in no event prior 
to the filing of the complaint.'"' In New Jersey, the interest 
38. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/2-1303 (Smith-Hurd 1992). 
39. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.09 (West Supp. 1994). 
40. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05 (West Supp. 1994). 
41. Id. 
42. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 13-21-101 (1987) (discount rate plus 2% per 
year); NEB. REV. STAT. 5 45-103 (1988) (T-bill rate plus 1%); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 15-1-4 (Supp. 1994) (federal post-judgment interest rate plus 2%); see generally 
Appendix 1. 
43. COLO. REV. STAT. $ 13-21-101 (1987). 
44. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, 5 2301 (1993). 
45. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.130 (Michie 1993). 
46. D.C. CODE ANN. 8 28-3302 (1991). 
47. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 360.040 (MichieBobbs-Merrill 1987) 
("judgment may bear less interest . . . if the court rendering such judgment, after 
a hearing on that question, is satisfied that the rate of interest should be less*). 
48. MISS. CODE ANN. 75-17-7 (1972). 
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rates on judgments are established by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court and set forth in the New Jersey court rules.49 
C. Changes in Rates 
When a legislature selects a method for establishing the 
post-judgment interest rate, it also selects the method for ad- 
justing that rate to reflect market interest rate changes. Where 
a statute provides for a set interest rate, the legislature must 
amend the statute to change the rate. While this method leaves 
all control in the hands of the legislative body, it also takes a 
great deal of time and effort, and legislatures are frequently 
slow to react to changes in market interest rates.50 
For this reason, many states have changed from a statuto- 
rily set rate to a rate based on an index or other measure of 
current market rates. Interest rates based on these indices 
allow the rate to track market rates without requiring repeated 
action by the legislature. 
Legislatures which leave the rate of interest to the discre- 
tion of the judge, or to the judiciary via court rules, have cho- 
sen to give the power both to set and to change post-judgment 
interest rates to nonlegislative bodies. While this approach 
allows for quicker changes and arguably more equitable re- 
sults, it is unclear whether it does a better or worse job of effec- 
tuating the compensatory purpose of post-judgment interest. 
D. Toward a Better Statute 
The best type of statutory provision for post-judgment 
interest is one that gives effect to the purpose of post-judgment 
interest. If the purpose of post-judgment interest is to compen- 
sate the judgment creditor for the time during which he or she 
does not have use of the money, then statutes which provide a 
rate of interest nearest the market rate while avoiding litiga- 
tion best fulfill that purpose. Statutes specifying a set percent- 
age interest rate fail to achieve this result. These types of stat- 
utes are generally at  or near market interest rates only ai the 
time they are created or amended. Thus, absent an amendment 
49. N.J. STAT. ANN. EJ 58:lOA-24.6 (West 1992); N.J. CT. R. 4:42-11. 
50. Today, when interest rates are as low as 6% and 7%, it is unreasonable 
for a judgment debtor to be required to pay post-judgment interest at  rates of 10% 
in states like Tennessee, Wyoming, Arizona, and Montana, and 12% in South Da- 
kota, Vermont, Alabama, and Rhode Island. For a complete list of each state's 
post-judgment interest rate, see Appendix 1. 
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every six or twelve months, either the judgment creditor or 
judgment debtor is disadvantaged during the appeals process 
because of the disparity between the statutory and the market 
rates. 
In addition, fixed-rate statutes are the most likely to result 
in litigation when a change in the rate is made. Litigation in  
turn results in prolonging the payment of interest and subject- 
ing the rate applied to uncertainty. A change in a fixed-rate 
statute inevitabily results in one party seeking to apply the 
new rate to the judgment debt and the other party wanting to 
apply the old rate to the judgment. Furthermore, most amend- 
ments simply change the numeric rate without providing clear 
direction to courts or litigants when the new rate is to apply. 
Some legislatures have addressed this problem by including 
express language explaining which judgments the amended 
rate applies to. This modification is helpful. Other states sim- 
ply amend the statute to list each rate ever used, along with 
the time period during which each rate applied, so that a judg- 
ment rendered during a particular period must bear the corre- 
sponding rate of in te re~t .~ '  Although these modifications re- 
sult in less confusion about which rate applies to a judgment, 
they are unfair to the judgment debtor or creditor unless they 
expressly provide for the new rate to apply to outstanding judg- 
ments as of the date the statute takes effect. As a result, they 
do not give effect to the purpose of the statute. 
Statutes which tie the rate of post-judgment interest to a n  
index come much closer to giving effect to the compensatory 
purpose of post-judgment interest provisions. These statutes 
inherently have the effect of establishing a post-judgment inter- 
est rate very near the current market rate, a t  least a t  the time 
the judgment is rendered? Their flaw, however, is that once 
the judgment is rendered, the rate of interest is fixed and then 
applies during the entire time the judgment is outstanding. 
Because the appeals process can take years and market rates 
of interest have shown a tendency to have wide fluctuations in  
short periods of time, the purpose of the statuteadequately 
51. See, e.g., LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 2924 (West 1994). 
52. Those statutes which add a fured percentage to an index rate are simply 
providing for the fad that the index is generally that of very low risk investments 
and the additional percentage increase anticipates the possibility that the judgment 
debtor could have invested the judgment money in higher yielding securities. 
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compensating the judgment creditor-is not effectuated as time 
passes and market rates change. 
Specific provisions should be included in post-judgment 
interest legislation which seeks to compensate the judgment 
creditor via interest on unpaid judgment debt. The actual rate 
provided for in the statute should be measured or based on an 
index which accurately reflects market interest rates on the 
date of the judgment. In addition, the statute should expressly 
provide for the rate on the outstanding judgment amount to 
change periodically. Thus, the outstanding judgment behs  
interest at the market rate over the entire period until pay- 
ment is complete, and not just for the first few months until 
the market rate changes. 
A good post-judgment interest statute will also expressly 
state the date upon which the statute will go into effect, as well 
as  whether it applies t o  all judgments, including outstanding 
judgments, or only to  judgments entered after its effective date. 
This provision will discourage potential litigation on the retro- 
activity issue. 
Nevada's post-judgment interest statute fulfills the purpose 
of allowing for post-judgment interest. The rate is equal to "the 
prime rate at the largest bank in Nevada as ascertained by the 
commissioner of financial institutions on January 1 or July 1, 
as the case may be, immediately preceding the date of judg- 
ment, plus 2 per~ent."~ The use of the prime rate at the larg- 
est bank in the state guarantees that the rate applied is the 
market rate for the state, regardless of rates prevailing in oth- 
er states or set by the federal government via its sale of gov- 
ernment securities. 
The Nevada statute goes even further, providing that "[tlhe 
rate must be adjusted accordingly on each January 1 and July 
1 thereafter until the judgment is satisfied."54 This provision 
guarantees that the rate on an outstanding judgment stays in 
line with Nevada market interest rates. Thus, the judgment 
creditor is compensated properly even if the market rates fluc- 
tuate after the date of judgment. 
Finally, the Nevada legislature expressly provided, "The 
provisions of this act apply only to causes of action which arise 
on or after July 1, 1987."~~ Thus, litigation over when the 
53. NEV. REV. STAT. A m .  § 17.130 (Michie 1993). 
54. Id. 
55. 1987 NEV. STAT. ch. 413, $ 8. 
6011 POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST CHANGES 615 
change became effective was eliminated by the express lan- 
guage of the amendment. A model post-judgment interest stat- 
ute, based on the principles discussed in this section and the 
Nevada statute, is included as Appendix 2. 
IV. AN APPLICATION: UTAH'S CHANGE IN POST-JUDGMENT 
INTEREST 
Effective May 3, 1993, Senate Bill Number 279 amended 
Utah Code $ 15-1-4, changing the interest rate on judgments 
other than those rendered on contracts to "bear interest a t  the 
federal post-judgment interest rate as of January 1 of each 
year, plus 2%."56 The federal post-judgment interest rate is 
based on the rate of one-year U.S. Treasury bills.57 On Janu- 
ary 1, 1993, this rate was 3.72%." Thus, under the amended 
Utah statute, the rate of interest for the year 1993 for judg- 
ments, other than those rendered on contracts, was 5.72%. The 
statute makes no specific provision regarding the application of 
the new rate t o  existing judgments. 
Prior t o  the amendment, the noncontract judgment interest 
rate was 12%.~' For example, on a hypothetical judgment of 
$1,000,000, the annual difference in post-judgment interest 
would be $62,800. It is clear that the difference between the 
two interest rates is signifi~ant.~' Thus, it would clearly be in 
56. 1993 Utah Laws 279. The full text of the amended statute reads as fol- 
lows: 
15-14. INTEREST ON JIJDGMENTS. 
(1) Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform to the 
contract and shall bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which 
shall be specified in the judgment. 
(2) Other judgments shall bear interest a t  the federal postjudgment 
interest rate as of January 1 of each year, plus 2%. 
(3) "Federal postjudgment interest rate" means the interest rate estab- 
lished for the federal court system under 28 U,S.C Sec. 1961, as  amend- 
ed. 
Id. 
57. This rate is "[c]alculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a 
rate equal to the coupon issue yield equivalent (as determined by the Secretary of 
the Treasury) of the average accepted auction price for the last auction of fAy-two 
week United States Treasury bills settled immediately prior to the date of the 
judgment." 28 U.S.C.A. 8 1961 (West Supp. 1994). 
58. See "52-Week T-Bill Rate Table Of Changes," distributed to Federal 
Courts. 
59. UTAH CODE ANN. 5 15-1-4 (1992). 
60. A $1 million judgment at 12% results in $120,000 per year in interest, 
while the same judgment a t  5.72% results in $57,200 per year, a difference of 
$62,800 per year, or about $172 per day. 
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the best interest of the judgment debtor to argue in favor of 
applying the new lower rate and the judgment creditor to argue 
for applying the old higher rate in effect on the day of the judg- 
ment. Litigation will be the result. 
In determining the retroactivity of the amended rate to 
existing judgments, the starting point of analysis is the plain 
language of the statute. The language "shall bear interest" is 
similar to statutes in other states, but alone is not sufficient 
basis for a court to find clear legislative intent regarding retro- 
active application. As a result, it will be necessary for a review- 
ing court t o  go beyond the language of the statute to determine 
whether the new interest rate will apply to a judgment ren- 
dered prior to its effective date. 
Although Utah courts have not directly addressed this 
issue, an argument can be made, based on Utah case law, that 
the new interest rate should be applied retroactively t o  the 
judgment from the date of entry of the judgment. The general 
rule in Utah is that amendments t o  statutes are not retroac- 
tive? However, in accordance with the prevailing view in oth- 
er states, statutes that are procedural or remedial in nature 
are exceptions to the rule prohibiting retroactivity.62 "A stat- 
ute is considered procedural or remedial . . . if the statute does 
not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested rights.9263 
In Marshall u. Industrial Cornrni~sion,~~ the Utah Su- 
preme Court addressed the question of whether t o  apply new 
amendments to workers' compensation statutes (providing for 
the inclusion of interest on awards for benefits) to an award 
based on an injury which occurred prior to  the effective date of 
the amendments. After considering the general rule of 
nonretroactive application of a statute and its exception for 
procedural or remedial statutes, the court found: 
Interest on a compensation award is incident to a right and a 
remedy that already exists. Retroactive application of the 
statute does not alter the substance of the compensation 
award. Payment of interest on an unpaid benefit neither 
creates a new right nor destroys an existing right. Therefore, 
61. UTAH CODE ANN. 3 68-3-3 (1993) ("No part of these revised statutes is 
retroactive, unless expressly so declared.") 
62. See, e.g., State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993); Department of 
Social Servs. v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000-01 (Utah 1982). 
63. Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 1990). 
64. 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985). 
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interest payments should be made on any benefits awarded 
after the effective date of the statute even though the injury 
had occurred before.65 
This holding, however, applies only to benefits awarded after 
the effective date of the statute. As a result, it is unlikely that 
a Utah court would apply the newly changed rate retroactively 
to prior judgments. 
The Utah court would next consider whether the newly 
amended statute should apply prospectively-from its effective 
date of May 3, 1993-to the pre-existing judgment. No Utah 
case law considers whether a judgment is a contract or simply 
the result of legislative grace. As a result, the court would have 
to consider decisions from other jurisdictions and their underly- 
ing rationale t o  determine whether, in Utah, a judgment is to 
be treated as a contract o r  as the result of legislative grace. 
Post-judgment interest is a valuable statutory provision 
which compensates the judgment creditor for not having the 
use of the judgment money during the appeals process. As a 
result, all fifty states and the federal government have made 
provisions for allowing post-judgment interest. However, be- 
cause amendments to  these statutes are common, a plethora of 
avoidable litigation has resulted. Simple changes suggested in 
this comment would result in a decrease in litigation and en- 
sure that post-judgment interest statutes fulfill their purpose 
more efficiently and effectively. 
Until these changes are made by legislatures, judgment 
creditors and debtors alike should be aware of the judicial 
treatment of amendments to post-judgment statutes following 
entry of a judgment. No court has retroactively applied an  
amended statute t o  a prior judgment from the date of judg- 
ment; however, the majority of the courts have applied the new 
statute to outstanding judgments prospectively from the date 
they become effective. 
Brian P. Miller 
65. Id. at 583 (citations omitted). 
618 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
Rate I 
Discount rate + 
2% / year 
State 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
District of 
Columbia 
Fed Reserve 
Discount Rate + 
5% 
70% of IRS 
rate. 
Statute 
ARK. CODE ANN. 5 16-65-114 (Michie 
1987). 
CAL. CN. PROc. CODE g 685.010 
(West 1987). 
COLO. REV. STAT. $ 13-21-101 (1987) 
(limited to personal injury cases). 
CONN. GEN. STAT. 5 50a-59 (Supp. 
1994). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. 
5 37-3a (Supp. 1994); 37-3b (1987). 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 g 2301 (1993). 
D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3302 (1981). 
See also D.C. CODE ANN. 5 15-109 
(1981). 
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Cases 
Conoco, Inc. v. ArnSouth Bank (In re 
Norman), 57 Bankr. 6 (Bankr. M.D. 
Ala. 1984). 
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Ander- 
son, 669 P.2d 956 (Alaska 1983). 
McBride v. Superior Ct., 635 P.2d 
178 (Ariz. 1981). 
Missouri & Ark. Lumber & Mining 
Co. v. Sebastian County, 249 U.S. 
170 (1919). 
- - -- 
American National Bank v. Bank of 
Peacock, 165 Cal. App. 3d 1206 
(1985). 
Maurice L. Bein, Inc. v. Housing 
Auth., 321 P.2d 753 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1958). 
Butler v. Rockwell, 29 P. 458 (Colo. 
1892). 
Thomas v. Sugarland Indus., 431 
A.2d 1271 (Del. 1981). 
Comments 
No retroactive effect. Interest 
a t  time of judgment is proper 
rate. 
Bases decision on clear lan- 
guage of statute. Amendment 
does not apply retroactively to 
judgment previously rendered. 
-- - 
Post-judgment interest i s  result 
of legislative grace and not con- 
tractual obligation. Amended 
rate applies to outstanding 
judgment from effective date. 
Interest is a matter, not of con- 
tract, but of legislative discre- 
tion, to be changed or ended a t  
will of legislature. 
Constitutional problems would 
arise from retroactive applica- 
tion. 
With pre-judgment interest, no 
retroactive application given to 
amendment. 
Applies contract theory; 
amendment does not apply to 
outstanding judgment. 
Amendment does not apply 
retroactively to judgment previ- 
ously rendered. 
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State 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Rate 
12% I year 
12% 1 year 
10% 1 year 
- - - - -  
5% + base rate (week- 
ly avg. yield of U.S. 
treasury) 
9% 1 year 
8% 1 year 
10% 1 year 
Statute 
FLA. STAT. ANN. 
5 55.03 (West 1994). 
GA. CODE ANN. 5 7-4- 
12 (1989). 
HAW. REV. STAT. 
5 478-3 (Supp. 1992). 
IDAHO CODE 28-22- 
104 (1993). 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 
735, para. 5/12-109 
(Smith-Hurd 1992). 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 
735, para. 5/2-1303 
(1992). 
IND. CODE ANN. 5 24- 
4.6-1-101 (Burns 
Supp. 1994). 
IOWA CODE ANN. 
5 535.3 (West Supp. 
1994). 
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Cases 
- - -- - - -- - 
Glades County v. Kurtz, 101 F.2d 
759 (5th Cir. 1939). 
Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co. v. 
Central Rigging & Contracting 
Corp., 684 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 
1982). 
Department of Transp. v. Delta 
Mach. Prods. Co., 291 S.E.2d 104 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1982) 
Camellia Corp. v. Cornell, 291 
S.E.2d 556 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982). 
McKeague v. Talbert, 658 P.2d 898 
(Haw. Ct. App. 1983). 
Desfosses v. Desfosses, 815 P.2d 
1094, 1101 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991). 
Noe v. City of Chicago, 307 N.E.2d 
376 (Ill. 1974). 
Chicago Rock Island & Pacific R.R. 
v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
R.R., 55 F.R.D. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1972). 
Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Western 
Refrigerating Co., 44 N.E. 746 (Ill. 
1896). 
Indiana Ins. Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 
437 N.E.2d 1381, 1391 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1982). 
In re Lattig, 318 N.W.2d 811 (Iowa 
Ct. App. 1982). 
Comments 
- - -- 
Amended rate applies from effec- 
tive date. Post-judgment interest 
i s  not contractual, but statutory. 
1980 amendment increasing from 
7% to 12% applied from effective 
date to judgments rendered before 
the effective date of amendment 
but not yet satisfied. 
Refuses to apply amended rate to 
outstanding judgment. 
Follows holding in Department of 
Transp. v. Delta Mach. Prods. Co., 
291 S.E.2d 104 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1982). 
Dicta: amendment cannot be ap- 
plied retroactively. 
-- 
Because the cause of action "ac- 
crued well before effective date of 
the amendment," rate a t  time of 
judgment was proper rate to ap- 
ply. 
Amended rate applied from effec- 
tive date. Post-judgment interest 
i s  solely the creature of statute. 
Dicta: post-judgment interest is 
governed by statute not contract. 
Amended rate applies from effec- 
tive date. 
Amended rate applied from effec- 
tive date. Post-judgment interest 
i s  solely the creature of statute. 
"Interest is  recoverable not as  
interest but as  additional damages 
to accomplish full compensation. 
The statutory interest rate is used 
merely as  a measure for the value 
of the lost use of the property." 
Bases decision on clear language 
of statute. Amendment does not 
apply retroactively to judgment 
previously rendered. 
622 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
Rate 
Discount rate + 4% 
(but depends on year 
of judgment) 
12% 1 year 
Variable depending on 
date. 
15% I year if Dist. Ct.; 
T-bill + 7% if not 
10% 1 year 
12% 1 year before 
1/1/87, 1% + 5yr T- 
notes rate after. 
Statute 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. 
art. 2924 (West 1994). 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 14, 5 1602-A (West 
Supp. 1993). 
Mu. CODE ANN., CTS. 
& JUD. PRoc. 5 11-107 
(1989). 
MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 235, 5 8 
(West 1986). 
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Cases 
Maxwell v. Redd, 496 P.2d 1320 
(Kan. 1972). 
Bartlett v. Heersche, 496 P.2d 1314 
(Kan. 1972). 
Lippert v. Angle, 508 P.2d 920 
(1973). 
Ridge v. Ridge, 572 S.W.2d 859 
(Ky. 1978). 
Hebert v. Travelers Ins. Co., 245 
So. 2d 563 (La. Ct. App. 1971). 
Mayor of Baltimore v. Kelso Corp., 
449 A.2d 406 (Md. 1982). 
Trinity Church v. John Hancock 
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 544 N.E.2d 584 
(Mass. 1989). 
Shelist v. Boston Redevelopment 
Auth., 215 N.E.2d 748 (Mass. 
1966). 
-- 
Herring v. Golden State Mut. Life 
Ins. Co., 318 N.W.2d 641,646 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982). 
Comments 
Amendment to pre-judgment in- 
terest statute given prospective 
application only. 
Bases decision on clear language 
of statute. Amendment does not 
apply retroactively to judgment 
previously rendered. (Compelling 
dissenting opinion). 
Pre-judgment interest. Amend- 
ment not given retrospective effect 
and doesn't change prior rate of 
interest. 
Post-judgment interest is  matter 
of legislative grace, not contrac- 
tual in nature. Amended rate 
applies from effective date of stat- 
ute. 
Bases decision on absence of stat- 
utory language intending to apply 
amendment retroactively. Amend- 
ment does not apply retroactively 
to judgment previously rendered. 
Post-judgment interest is  a matter 
of legislative grace, is  not contrac- 
tual in nature. Change in rate 
applies from date of change to all 
outstanding judgments. 
Amended rate applied from effec- 
tive date. 
Absent clear statutory language, 
an amendment which affects sub- 
stantive rights is not retroactive. 
A change in post-judgment inter- 
est affects substantive rights. 
Statutes "having a punitive pur- 
pose, are never given retroactive 
effect." No retroactive application 
absent clear legislative intent. 
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Rate 
Secondary market 
yield on one year T- 
bill 
Rate set by judge 
9% / year 
10% / year 
Prime rate a t  largest 
bank + 2%. 
10% 1 year 
prior to 4/1/75 6%; 
4/1/75 to 9/13/81 8%; 
9/14/81 to l./1/86 12%; 
1/2/86 to current 
based on state fund 
Statute 
MINN. STAT. ANN. 
$ 549.09 (West Supp. 
1994). 
MISS. CODE ANN. 
$ 75-17-7 (1972). 
Mo. ANN. STAT. 
$408.040 (Vernon 
1990). 
NEB. REV. STAT. g 45- 
103 (1988). See also 
NEB. REV. STAT. $45- 
103.01 (1988) 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
$ 17.130 (Michie 
1993). 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
$ 336:l (1984). 
N.J. CT. R. 4:42-11. 
6011 POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST CHANGES 625 
Cases 
-- - -- 
White v. St. Louis-San Francisco 
Ry., 602 S.W.2d 748 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1980). 
Senn v. Commerce-Manchester 
Bank, 603 S.W.2d 551 (Mo. 1980). 
Stanford v. Coram, 72 P. 655 
(Mont. 1903). 
Arnold v. Mt. Wheeler Power Co., 
707 P.2d 1137 (Nev. 1985). 
Bhy Trucking, Inc. v. Hicks, 720 
P.2d 1229 (Nev. 1986), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 994 (1986). 
Comments 
- 
Post-judgment interest is  substan- 
tive, not procedural right. Howev- 
er, right to post-judgment interest 
is  statutory, not contractual in na- 
ture. Amended rate applies from 
effective date of statute. 
Post-judgment interest is  matter 
of legislative grace, is  not contrac- 
tual in nature. Amended rate 
applies from effective date of stat- 
ute. 
A judgment rendered prior to the 
date when the amendment to this 
section went into effect bore inter- 
est of 10% until that  date and only 
8% thereafter. 
This is  not a post-judgment inter- 
est statute, but a computation of 
interest statute. 
Cause of action arose before 
amendment (increasing rate to 
12%), interest should have been 
awarded a t  the lower rate until 
judgment satisfied. Not retroactive 
where complaint filed prior to any 
amendments. 
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Rate 
8 314% 1 year 
9% 1 year 
8% 1 year 
12% I year 
10% 1 year 
- -- 
4% + T-Bill rate at 1st 
of year 
9% 1 year 
Statute 
N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 56- 
8-4 (Michie Supp. 
1994). 
N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. & 
R. 5003 (McKinney 
1992). See also N.Y. 
CIV. PRAc. L. & R. 
5004 (McKinney 
1992). 
N.C. GEN STAT. 5 24-1 
(1991). 
N.D. CENT. CODE 
5 28-20-34 (1993). 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
5 1343.03 (Anderson 
1993). 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, 
$ 727 (1988). 
POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST CHANGES 
North v. Public Serv. Co., 680 P.2d 
603 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983). 
In re Bronx River Parkway, 20 
N.Y.S.2d 53 (App. Div. 1940). 
Atlantic, Gulf & Pac. Co. v. Miller, 
17 N.Y.S.2d 202 (Sup. Ct. 1939). 
In re Gillespie, 16 N.Y.S.2d 579 
(Sup. Ct. 1939). 
Morley v. Lake Shore & Mich. So. 
Ry., 146 U.S. 162 (1892). 
EEOC v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 690 
F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1982). 
Swanson v. Flynn, 31 N.W. 2d 320 
(N.D. 1948). 
Prepakt Concrete Co. v. Koski 
Constr. Co., 573 N.E.2d 209 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1989) 
Tony Zumbo & Son Constr. Co. v. 
Transportation Dept., 490 N.E.2d 
621 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). 
Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Great Lakes 
Carbon Corp., 476 P.2d 329 (Okla. 
1970). 
Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 702 
F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1983). 
Convoy Co. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 
672 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1982). 
-- 
Comments 
1983 Amendment applies prospec- 
tively. 
Applies interest in "takings" case 
a t  old rate until effective date of 
amendment. 
Interest on tax refunds. Interest is  
a creature of statute and not of 
contract. Amended rate applies 
from effective date. 
"Takings" case. Amendment does 
not impair existing contractual 
obligations. Amended rate applies 
from effective date. 
Once merged into judgment, post- 
judgment interest is  not a matter 
of contract. Legislature may 
change a t  will. 
Clear legislative language and 
intent. Not retroactive. 
- - 
Post-judgment interest is  statuto- 
ry and not contractual in nature. 
Amended rate applies to out- 
standing judgment from effective 
date. 
Pre-judgment interest. Apply the 
rate a t  time of judgment. 
Pre-judgment amended rate ap- 
plies to outstanding judgment 
from effective date. 
Bases decision on clear language 
of statute. Amendment does not 
apply retroactively to judgment 
previously rendered. 
Following prior state supreme 
court ruling, refused to apply 
amended rate to outstanding judg- 
ment, but see footnote 9 for sug- 
gested "sounder rule." 
Pre-judgment interest: allows 
amended rate to apply from effec- 
tive date forward. 
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Rate 
Unable to determine 
12% / year 
14% / year 
10% / year 
10% 1 year 
Discount rate (but, 
min of 10% and max 
of 20%) 
Federal post-judgment 
interest rate + 2%. 
Statute 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, 
5 8101 (1982) 
R.I. GEN. LAWS 5 6- 
26-1 (1992). 
- - 
S.C. CODE ANN. 5 34- 
31-20(B) (Law. Co-op. 
1987). 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
ANN. 5 54-3-5.1 
(1990); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS ANN. 5 54-3- 
16(2) (Supp. 1994). 
TENN. CODE ANN. 
5 47-14-121 (1988). 
TEXAS REV. CIV. STAT. 
ANN. art. 5069-1.05 
(West Supp. 1994). 
UTAH CODE ANN. 
5 15-1-4 (SUPP. 1994). 
6011 POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST CHANGES 629 
Cases 
Carner v. Grist Mill '76 Corp., 645 
F. Supp. 331, 337 (D.R.I. 1986). 
Sears v. Fowler, 358 S.E.2d 574, 
575 (S.C. 1987). 
Southeastern Freight Lines v. 
Michelin Tire Corp., 303 S.E.2d 
860 (S.C. 1983). 
- -- 
Commissioner of Transp. v. 
McDougal, 648 S.W.2d 254 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1983). 
Manley v. Sammons Enter., Inc., 
563 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1978). 
Costal Industrial Water Auth. v. 
Trinity Portland Cement Div., 563 
S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1978). 
Herron v. Lackey, 556 S.W.2d 246 
(Tex. 1977). 
Comments 
Pre-judgment interest: 1981 
amendment (6% to 12%), was 
intended to apply to inchoate obli- 
gations previously executed-that 
is, to have retrospective effect. 
"[Plurpose of post-judgment in- 
terest is to penalize nonpayment 
of a judgment by a judgment debt- 
or." 
Post-judgment interest i s  matter 
of legislative grace, is  not contrac- 
tual. Amended rate applies to out- 
standing judgments from effective 
date. 
Post-judgment interest is  a matter 
of statutory grace, not in the form 
of contract. Thus, amended rate 
applies to outstanding judgment 
from effective date. 
Amendment does not apply retro- 
actively to judgment previously 
rendered. 
Bases decision on clear language 
of statute. Amendment does not 
apply retroactively to judgment 
previously rendered. 
With little analysis, court refuses 
to apply amended rate to out- 
standing judgment. 
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11 State I Rate 
II Virgin Islands I 9% / year 
Vermont 
II Virginia I 9% 1 year 
12% / year 
Wisconsin 12% / year 
Wyoming 10% / year 
Washington 
Statute 
Higher of 12% / year 
or yield of 26 week T- 
bill + 4%. 
-- --- 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 
5 2903 (Supp. 1993). 
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, 
§ 426 (Supp. 1994). 
VA. CODE ANN. 5 6.1- 
330.54 (Michie 1993). 
West Virginia 1 10% / year 
WASH. REV. CODE 
5 4.56.110 (Supp. 
1994) and WASH. REV. 
CODE 5 19.52.020 
(Supp. 1994). 
W. VA. CODE g 56-6- 
31 (Supp. 1994). 
WIS. STAT. ANN. 
5 815.05(8) (1994). 
WYO. STAT. 5 1-16-102 
(Supp. 1994). 
6011 POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST CHANGES 631 
Cases 
Puget Sound Nat'l Bank v. St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 645 P.2d 
1122 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982). 
Palmer v. Laberee, 63 P. 216 
(Wash. 1900). 
Ferris v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust 
Co., 292 N.W.2d 357 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1980). 
Comments 
-- 
Bases decision on clear language 
of statute. Amendment does not 
apply retroactively to judgment 
previously rendered. Dicta: post- 
judgment interest is not contrac- 
tual matter, but one of legislative 
discretion. 
Post-judgment interest i s  a matter 
of legislative grace, i s  not contrac- 
tual. Amended rate applies from 
effective date. 
Amended rate applies prospec- 
tively from the date of judgment 
previously rendered. 
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Model Post- Judgment Interest Statute 
(1) Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform to the con- 
tract and shall bear interest agreed upon by the parties. 
(2) All other judgments shall bear interest from the date of the judgment 
until payment, a t  a rate equal to the prime rate a t  the largest bank in 
STATE on January 1 or July 1, as  the case may be, immediately preceding 
the date of the judgment, plus - percent. The rate must be adjusted accord- 
ingly on each January 1 and July 1 thereafter until the judgment is satisfied. 
(3) The post-judgment interest provided for in this section shall be collect- 
able as a part of each judgment whether or not the judgment specifically 
reflects the entitlement to such interest. 
(4) The provisions of this act apply only to judgments entered on or after 
